2215. Externalities in vaccination queues
Invited abstract in session FA-8: Game Theory and Strategic Behavior in Real-World Systems, stream Game Theory and Behavioral Management Science.
Friday, 8:45-10:15Room: H8
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Hamed Jalali
|
| Department of information systems, supply chain management, and decision making, NEOMA Business school | |
| 2. | Ata Jalili Marand
|
| Economics and Business Economics, Aarhus university |
Abstract
Vaccination queues have been empirically shown to significantly influence individuals' decisions to seek vaccination. A substantial body of evidence highlights that long waiting times are among the primary factors contributing to low vaccination rates. While many studies modeling strategic behavior in vaccine supply chains use utility theory to capture individuals’ decision-making processes, they often overlook the critical role of waiting time in shaping these decisions. In this paper, we model a game between a social planner, who seeks to maximize social welfare, and self-interested individuals, who aim to optimize their waiting-time-sensitive utilities. As in classical vaccination games, the social planner must address positive externalities: individuals tend to free ride, benefiting from reduced infection risk due to others’ vaccinations without considering the broader public health impact of their own. Our model further introduces negative externalities: individuals also neglect the additional waiting time their presence imposes on others. We show that when vaccination capacity is limited or individuals are highly sensitive to waiting, unregulated demand for vaccination —absent any intervention by the social planner—can exceed the socially optimal level due to these negative externalities. In such cases, we compute a vaccination fee to align individual behavior with the social optimum. Conversely, when capacity is abundant or individuals are more tolerant of waiting, demand may fall short of the socially optimal level due to positive externalities, and we derive the incentive required to close this gap. Finally, we investigate the potential of priority queues to mitigate both externalities and provide guidance on their optimal design.
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Health Care
Status: accepted
Back to the list of papers