571. Structural Program of Electricity Demand Response in Brazil: State-of-the-Art, Challenges, Opportunities, and Market Equilibrium
Invited abstract in session TA-44: Modelling coordination challenges in the energy transition, stream Energy Economics & Management.
Tuesday, 8:30-10:00Room: Newlyn 1.01
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Bruno Fanzeres
|
| Industrial Engineering, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro | |
| 2. | Gabriel Miguez Longhi
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| Industrial Engineering Department, Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro |
Abstract
In this talk, we evaluate the Brazilian Demand Response (DR) initiative called Structural Program (SP) from the perspective of both consumers and market-design agents. We begin by providing an overview of the current state of DR programs in Brazil, examining regulatory environments, market designs, and recent efforts to increase consumer involvement in DR initiatives. We particularly explore the rationale and conceptual design of the SP. From a methodological viewpoint, we model the pipeline for decision-making in this DR initiative, beginning by describing its auction structure and characterizing its operational and financial dynamics. Then, we propose a methodology for devising bidding strategies for consumers in the program as a two-stage problem modeled in a bilevel optimization structure. More specifically, the first stage aims to maximize the consumer benefits by optimizing bid parameters to achieve high revenue levels compensated by opportunity costs, and the second stage evaluates market and system dynamics to assess the bids clearance in the day-ahead dispatch program. Finally, we devise a procedure to identify Nash Equilibrium points in the SP based on fixed-point techniques. A numerical experiment using real data from the Brazilian power system is presented to discuss insights into the SP under a Nash Equilibrium point. We illustrate that this DR initiative can enhance participant outcomes, improve market efficiency, and strengthen system flexibility.
Keywords
- Electricity Markets
- OR in Energy
- Game Theory
Status: accepted
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