2529. Optimal control of cartel violence: Multiple equilibria, narrow corridors, and weak Skiba curves
Invited abstract in session TA-53: New Trends in Game Theory IV, stream Game Theory and Mathematical Economics.
Tuesday, 8:30-10:00Room: Liberty Moot Court
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Gernot Tragler
|
| Institute for Statistics and Mathematical Methods in Economics, Vienna University of Technology | |
| 2. | Jonathan Caulkins
|
| H. John Heinz III School of Public Policy & Management, Carnegie Mellon University | |
| 3. | Dieter Grass
|
| Vienna University of Technology | |
| 4. | Gian Maria Campedelli
|
| Fondazione Bruno Kessler | |
| 5. | Gustav Feichtinger
|
| Institute of Statistics and Mathematical Methods in Economics, Vienna University of Technology | |
| 6. | Rafael Prieto-Curiel
|
| Complexity Science Hub | |
| 7. | Stefan Wrzaczek
|
| Economic Frontiers, Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) |
Abstract
We present an optimal control model for evaluating how Mexico might best use two instruments (security measures and social programs) to control a pair of criminal cartels that are in lethal conflict with each other. For our model and parameters being made as realistic as possible, our analysis is meant to provide guidance to the Mexican government. In this presentation we will mostly focus on variations on our model and parameters that reveal interesting structural features, because we believe that the basic architecture of our model is intrinsically interesting to the optimal control community - both with respect to the structure of the solutions and their economic interpretation. Our results are derived with the help of bifurcation analyses and include solutions with as many as ten equilibria, some separated by double and even triple Skiba points.
Keywords
- Optimal Control
- OR/MS and the Public Sector
- Economic Modeling
Status: accepted
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