1428. Carbon Emissions Reduction and Fresh-Keeping Strategies of Fresh Food Supply Chain under Heterogeneous Carbon Tax Policies
Invited abstract in session TC-42: Regulations in sustainable supply chains, stream Circular & Sustainable Supply Chains.
Tuesday, 12:30-14:00Room: Newlyn GR.02
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Songsong Liu
|
| School of Management, Harbin Institute of Technology | |
| 2. | Mingxuan Chen
|
| Harbin Institute of Technology |
Abstract
Climate change has prompted global countries to implement carbon emissions reduction policies, including carbon tax policy, etc. However, no literature work has considered both carbon emissions reduction and fresh-keeping strategies under the broader effects of heterogeneous carbon tax policies. This work considers a fresh food supply chain consisting of one supplier and one retailer, which decide their freshness-keeping and carbon emissions reduction efforts, as well as pricing. Three different carbon tax policy configurations are examined, including upstream-only, downstream-only, and bilateral carbon tax. Decentralized decision-making is investigated based on Stackelberg game theory. In addition, the centralized decision-making is considered and a Nash bargaining based profit-sharing scheme is proposed for fair profit allocation. The effect of carbon tax rate on the optimal strategies is also investigated. The results reveal that upstream-only, as well as downstream-only, carbon tax directly impacts the tax payer’s emissions reduction effort and indirectly affects the other one. Full-chain carbon tax induces significantly higher emissions reduction and fresh-keeping efforts, with elevated wholesale and retail prices, while the supplier’s profit increases whereas the retailer’s profit declines, compared with upstream-only tax, and vice versa for the downstream-only tax, showing trade-off between economic and environmental effects.
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Supply Chain Management
- OR in Sustainability
Status: accepted
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