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4392. A Solomonic Approach to Core Allocations For Big Boss Games
Invited abstract in session WC-40: Experimental economics and game theory 2, stream Experimental economics and game theory.
Wednesday, 12:30-14:00Room: 96 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | İsmail Özcan
|
| Operations Research Center, Universidad Miguel Hernández | |
| 2. | Ana Meca
|
| Operations Research Center, Universidad Miguel Hernández |
Abstract
In this study, a new core allocation formula using the tau-value and Shapley-value for the big boss games class has been proposed, referred to as the weight function, and a generalization has been provided. The tau-value consistently belongs to the core, whereas the Shapley value may not be part of the core in the big boss game class. While the tau-value might favor the big boss, it might not meet the expectations of other players. Conversely, the Shapley-value could satisfy other players but might not suffice for the big boss. To resolve this dilemma, we proposed a new core allocation family and a Solomonic solution procedure for the big boss games class.
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Decision Theory
- Economic Modeling
Status: accepted
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