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4276. Branch-and-price with novel cuts, and a new Stackelberg Security Game
Invited abstract in session WA-36: Game Theory, Solutions and Structures IX, stream Game Theory, Solutions and Structures.
Wednesday, 8:30-10:00Room: 32 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Pamela Alejandra Bustamante Faúndez
|
| Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile |
Abstract
Anticipating the strategies of potential attackers is crucial for protecting critical infrastructure. We can represent the challenge of the defenders of such infrastructure as a Stackelberg security game. The defender must decide how to allocate limited resources to protect specific targets, aiming to maximize their expected utility (such as minimizing the extent of damage) and considering that attackers will respond in a way that is most advantageous to them.
We present novel and stronger valid inequalities to find a Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium in both Stackelberg games and Stackelberg security games. We also present a new Stackelberg security game that aims to protect targets with a defined budget. We use branch-and-price in this new game to show that our approach outperforms the standard formulation in the literature, and we conduct an extensive computational study to analyze the impact of various branch-and-price parameters on the performance of our method in different game settings.
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Algorithms
- Programming, Mixed-Integer
Status: accepted
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