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4262. Priority queues with competitive servers
Invited abstract in session WB-36: Game Theory, Solutions and Structures X, stream Game Theory, Solutions and Structures.
Wednesday, 10:30-12:00Room: 32 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Binyamin Oz
|
| The Hebrew University of Jerusalem . | |
| 2. | Elisheva Zur
|
| Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
Abstract
We consider a queueing system with competitive revenue maximizing servers who charge for priority. Customers are strategic and decide which server to seek service from and whether to pay for priority. Through an analysis of the equilibrium in this sequential two-stage game, we demonstrate that the system exhibits self-regulation. Specifically, contrary to systems lacking priority mechanisms, our findings reveal that socially optimal joining rates are attained.
Keywords
- Queuing Systems
- Game Theory
Status: accepted
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