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4145. Mechanism design for job reassignments in collaborative manufacturing
Invited abstract in session TC-49: Lot-sizing with game theory aspects, stream Lot Sizing, Lot Scheduling and Production Planning.
Tuesday, 12:30-14:00Room: M1 (building: 101)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
1. | Margaretha Gansterer
|
University of Klagenfurt | |
2. | Dominik Zehetner
|
University of Klagenfurt |
Abstract
The remarkable success of sharing economy platforms in the B2C sector has led to increased attention from both practitioners and researchers seeking to apply these models to the B2B sector. Studies have already demonstrated that combined with cloud manufacturing and additive manufacturing, these concepts can considerably reduce costs while the responsiveness supply chains is increased. However, there is a need to design resource allocation mechanisms such that desirable properties are to be achieved. Promising approaches for such an environment are decentralized combinatorial auction frameworks that can be used to exchange jobs to decrease production costs of operations efficiently and effectively. In our approach, machines autonomously select jobs from an existing production plan to forward them to other suppliers that can produce these parts for lower costs. An auctioneer creates promising part bundles and manufacturing machines autonomously place bids on the packages via a combinatorial second price reverse auction. Costs of the reallocated bundles are shared throughout a Shapley value-based approach without the need to disclose critical information. We provide analytical and numerical insights on this approach and show if and how desirable properties such as budget balance, incentive compatibility, and individual rationality can be achieved.
Keywords
- Manufacturing
- Combinatorial Optimization
- Auctions / Competitive Bidding
Status: accepted
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