EURO-Online login
- New to EURO? Create an account
- I forgot my username and/or my password.
- Help with cookies
(important for IE8 users)
3728. One Man, One Vote, One Price
Invited abstract in session TB-36: Game Theory, Solutions and Structures VI, stream Game Theory, Solutions and Structures.
Tuesday, 10:30-12:00Room: 32 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | László Kóczy
|
| Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences | |
| 2. | Balázs R. Sziklai
|
| Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences |
Abstract
Originally introduced to allocate parliamentary seats among states or provinces, apportionment methods can distribute any scarce discrete resource based on a series of claims or budgets. Here, we focus on the price of representation: how one can turn the claims, such as the number of voters, into a share of the resource, such as the parliamentary seats. The D'Hondt method naturally emerges as a competitive equilibrium. We show that the class of parametric divisor methods is fully characterised by a competitive equilibrium augmented by a uniform credit or debt with respect to the original claims.
While in a competitive equilibrium, all pay the same price, states or provinces are not equally efficient at converting their claims. Optimization apportionment methods such as the Leximin focus on minimizing price differences. We demonstrate how the D'Hondt and Adams methods can be formulated as optimization methods and highlight their connection to the Leximin method.
Keywords
- Group Decision Making and Negotiation
- Industrial Optimization
- Game Theory
Status: accepted
Back to the list of papers