EURO 2024 Copenhagen
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3680. Dynamic Contracts For Queuing Service Systems

Contributed abstract in session MD-15: Healthcare services, stream OR in Health Services (ORAHS).

Monday, 14:30-16:00
Room: 18 (building: 116)

Authors (first author is the speaker)

1. Ji Chen
Dongbei University of Finance and Economics
2. Man Yu
3. Laurens Debo
Dartmouth College

Abstract

We analyze a service provider's optimal design of service contracts, which specify service priority and pricing for consumers (e.g., patients) of different types. The analysis incorporates both static and dynamic contracts and considers consumer heterogeneity following either discrete or continuous distributions. It demonstrates the profit advantage of dynamic contracts over static contracts and characterizes the conditions under which the advantage is most pronounced.

Keywords

Status: accepted


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