EURO-Online login
- New to EURO? Create an account
- I forgot my username and/or my password.
- Help with cookies
(important for IE8 users)
3460. Strategyproofness of Credit Mechanisms for Kidney Exchange
Invited abstract in session TC-10: Kidney Exchange I, stream OR in Health Services (ORAHS).
Tuesday, 12:30-14:00Room: 11 (building: 116)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Bart Smeulders
|
| Mathematics and Computer Science, Eindhoven University of Technology |
Abstract
Increasing the scale of kidney exchanges leads to improved outcomes for patients, as it increases the possibility of compatible donors being present. One way to increase scale is by collaboration between different hospitals or countries. However, it has been shown that in single period settings, no strategyproof mechanisms exist to organize such collaborations. This has led to an interest in credit mechanisms which function over multiple time periods. Individual agents reveal pairs to the collaboration, and receive credits in return. These influence which transplants are selected, where more credits lead the choice of solutions that are more beneficial to the agent. Based on the transplants received, credits are subtracted. Such mechanisms can lead to fairer outcomes, but also potentially escape the impossibility of strategyproof mechanisms in single period settings.
In this talk, we look in particular at credit mechanisms proposed by Klimentova et al. (2021) and Biro et al. (2020). These mechanisms divide credits equal to the number of transplants obtained in an optimal solution, and each transplants “costs” one credit. We discuss the strategyproofness of their proposed mechanisms, and more in general of all mechanisms sharing some important properties with these.
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Health Care
Status: accepted
Back to the list of papers