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3008. Learning and Forgetting in Oligopoly
Invited abstract in session TA-36: Game Theory, Solutions and Structures V, stream Game Theory, Solutions and Structures.
Tuesday, 8:30-10:00Room: 32 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Paola Labrecciosa
|
| ELS, ESSCA School of Management | |
| 2. | Luca Colombo
|
| Finance and Accounting, Rennes School of Business |
Abstract
In this paper, we are interested in assessing how changing the market structure interacts with learning spillovers and organizational forgetting to affect incentives to innovate via learning. In particular, we are interested in studying the relationship between market competition and learning-by-doing, a type of innovation, aiming to contribute to the classical debate over the relationship between market structure and innovation. We provide conditions under which a symmetric Closed-Loop Nash Equilibrium exists. Then we conduct a comparative steady state analysis with respect to the parameters of the model. The main conclusion of our analysis is that conditions on the diffusion rate of knowledge and the rate of organizational forgetting exist under which an increase in market competition is not necessarily welfare-enhancing.
Keywords
- Economic Modeling
- Game Theory
- Dynamical Systems
Status: accepted
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