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3002. Reneging behavior of customers in a queueing system subject to breakdowns and repairs
Invited abstract in session TA-40: Queueing Models with Strategic Customers, stream Advances in Stochastic Modelling and Learning Methods.
Tuesday, 8:30-10:00Room: 96 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Dimitrios Logothetis
|
| Mathematical Institute, Leiden University | |
| 2. | Odysseas Kanavetas
|
| Mathematical Institute, Leiden University |
Abstract
We consider a Markovian queueing system with a single server which is subject to breakdowns. When a breakdown occurs, the server continues its operation but at a reduced service speed. The repair process initiates only when the system is empty and during that time, customers continue to accumulate without receiving service. Customers are strategic, and while observing the state of the system, they may choose to renege at any point. To study the impact of reneging behavior, we also consider a similar model where reneging is prohibited, and customers only decide whether to join the system or to balk. In these scenarios, we derive the equilibrium strategy of the customers and we compute the steady state distribution under equilibrium. In particular, we find that in equilibrium, the customers follow a triple threshold strategy which we characterize. To analyze the effect of the customer reneging behavior, we conduct a theoretical comparison of these systems and perform several numerical experiments. We identify cases where reneging is beneficial in terms of social welfare, as well as cases where prohibiting reneging ensures greater welfare.
Keywords
- Queuing Systems
- Game Theory
Status: accepted
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