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2896. Bidding Strategies in Treasury Auctions
Invited abstract in session TD-43: Market Design 1, stream Market Design.
Tuesday, 14:30-16:00Room: 99 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Sasa Pekec
|
| Duke University | |
| 2. | Aleksandrs Smilgins
|
| Department of Economics |
Abstract
We use data from Danish and Swedish treasury auctions to analyze differences in bidding strategies and auction performance. Our analysis suggests that underreporting true valuations is more pronounced under discriminatory auction format than under uniform auction format. Analogously, underreporting of true demand quantity is more pronounced under discriminatory auction format than under uniform auction format. We find no significant difference in the expected government profit (relative to the market prices).
Keywords
- Auctions / Competitive Bidding
- Analytics and Data Science
- Finance and Banking
Status: accepted
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