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2634. Platform Finance and Channel Strategies of Dual Channels
Invited abstract in session WA-36: Game Theory, Solutions and Structures IX, stream Game Theory, Solutions and Structures.
Wednesday, 8:30-10:00Room: 32 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Nina Yan
|
| Central University of Finance and Economics |
Abstract
In the platform economy, e-commerce platforms serve as distribution channels and financing providers through online loans. This study focuses on platform finance, where credit lines or interest rates are set, offering limited or unlimited loans to capital-constrained sellers. The optimal sellers’ channel strategy (single, online-dominant, or offline-dominant dual channels) depends on the platform’s credit line, consumers’ channel preferences, and switching behavior. With unlimited (or limited) loans, the seller’s dominated channel’s quantity decreases (or increases) with initial capital. Preferences for unlimited or limited loans depend on the dominant channel and capital constraints. Loan offerings lead to Pareto improvements for both sellers and platforms. Compared to bank finance, platform finance increases sellers' threshold quantities without stockouts in each channel, encouraging higher quantities in both channels. The study explores the channel substitution effect on sellers' quantity decisions, offering insights for optimal financing and channel structures to boost profits.
Keywords
- E-Commerce
- Supply Chain Management
- Game Theory
Status: accepted
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