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2406. Valuing the Electricity Produced Locally in Renewable Energy Communities through Noncooperative Resources Scheduling Games
Invited abstract in session TB-9: Game Theoretic Market Equilibrium Modelling, stream Energy Markets.
Tuesday, 10:30-12:00Room: 10 (building: 116)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
1. | Louise Sadoine
|
Mathematics, Université de Mons (UMONS) | |
2. | Zacharie De Greve
|
Electrical Power Engineering Unit, Unkiversité de Mons | |
3. | Thomas Brihaye
|
UMONS |
Abstract
Renewable energy communities play a crucial role in the energy transition. Members own distributed energy resources and are stakeholders of their own energy supply. We propose two market designs for the optimal day-ahead scheduling of internal energy exchanges. The first one implements a collaborative demand-side management scheme inside a community where members objectives are coupled through grid tariffs, the second allows the valuation of excess generation in the community and on the retail market. Two grid tariff structures are tested, one academic and one which reflects the Belgian regulations in terms of grid tariffs. Individuals' bills are obtained through 4 cost allocation methods. Both designs are formulated as optimization problems and as noncooperative games. In the latter case, the existence and efficiency of the corresponding (generalized) Nash Equilibria are studied and algorithms for finding these are proposed. The models are tested on a use-case of 55 members and compared with a benchmark situation where members act individually. We compute the global and individual costs, inefficiencies of decentralized models compared to social optima, as well as technical indices. First, we show that there always exists an equilibrium that is a social optimum. Secondly, we show, analytically when possible, and empirically if not, that the community and the individuals' bills obtained with the centralized and decentralized approaches are equivalent.
Keywords
- Convex Optimization
- Game Theory
- Energy Policy and Planning
Status: accepted
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