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239. Incentive-Compatible Cost Allocations for Inventory Games with Private Information
Invited abstract in session WB-36: Game Theory, Solutions and Structures X, stream Game Theory, Solutions and Structures.
Wednesday, 10:30-12:00Room: 32 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Yinlian Zeng
|
| Logistics Management, Shenzhen Technology University |
Abstract
In this paper we design cost allocation rules for inventory games with private information. First, we design incentive-compatible cost allocation rules for inventory games with private information via Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) rules. Then, we propose incentive-compatible and approximate budget-balanced cost allocations via polynomial approximations such as the Chebyshev
approximation and the Taylor approximation. In addition, we propose an incentive-compatible cost allocation with individual rationality. Finally, we conduct numerical experiments to compare the performance of the proposed cost allocations.
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Inventory
- Supply Chain Management
Status: accepted
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