EURO 2024 Copenhagen
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2219. Discontinuous Nash Equilibria in a Two-Stage Linear-Quadratic Dynamic Game With Linear Constraints

Invited abstract in session WC-41: Nonsmooth optimization algorithms I, stream Nonsmooth Optimization.

Wednesday, 12:30-14:00
Room: 97 (building: 306)

Authors (first author is the speaker)

1. Rajani Singh
Department of Digitalization, Copenhagen Business School
2. Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics, University of Warsaw

Abstract

In this work, we study a simple example of a two-stage
linear-quadratic dynamic game in which the presence of simple
linear state dependent constraints results in nonexistence of continuous symmetric feedback Nash equilibria and the existence of
continuum of discontinuous symmetric feedback Nash equilibria.
The example is not an abstract model—it has obvious applications
in economics of resource extraction.

Keywords

Status: accepted

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