EURO-Online login
- New to EURO? Create an account
- I forgot my username and/or my password.
- Help with cookies
(important for IE8 users)
2029. Information Sharing and Manufacturer Rebate Competition
Invited abstract in session WB-61: Retail Cooperation and Competition, stream Retail Operations.
Wednesday, 10:30-12:00Room: S10 (building: 101)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Albert Ha
|
| Information Systems, Business Statistics and Operations Management, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology |
Abstract
We investigate the incentive for a retailer to share private demand information with two rebate-offering manufacturers who sell substitutable products through the retailer. We characterize how the retailer’s information sharing decision depends on key factors such as the proportion of rebate-sensitive consumers and competition intensity. Without side payment, the retailer will not share information with a monopolistic manufacturer, but he may do so with none, one or both of the manufacturers when there is competition. With side payment, the retailer always prefers to sell information concurrently instead of sequentially to the manufacturers.
Keywords
- Supply Chain Management
Status: accepted
Back to the list of papers