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1608. Uncertain Preferences to deal with the Framing Effect in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
Invited abstract in session MD-36: Game Theory, Solutions and Structures IV, stream Game Theory, Solutions and Structures.
Monday, 14:30-16:00Room: 32 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Deoclecio Castro
|
| School of Economics and Management, University of Porto | |
| 2. | Leandro Rêgo
|
| Statistics and Applied Math Department, Universidade Federal do Ceará |
Abstract
In this article, our goal is to present a method that enables us to perform an analysis using the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution (GMCR) in conflicts scenarios where the preferences of decision makers show inconsistencies due to the Framing Effect. More specifically, we consider a GMCR with two decision makers who presented different preferences when, during the elicitation process, they were confronted with the same problem framed in two distinct ways. This behavior is inconsistent with Decision Theory and may be explained by the boundaries of human rationality. Our approach uses uncertain preferences to address the inconsistencies arising from the Framing Effect.
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Group Decision Making and Negotiation
- Behavioural OR
Status: accepted
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