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1518. Strategic Behaviour in Priority Queues with Deadlines.
Invited abstract in session TC-36: Game Theory, Solutions and Structures VII, stream Game Theory, Solutions and Structures.
Tuesday, 12:30-14:00Room: 32 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Jesse Nagel
|
| Stochastics, CWI | |
| 2. | Joris Slootweg
|
| Stochastics, CWI |
Abstract
In many queueing systems customer satisfaction is determined more by the meeting of a deadline (missing a flight, service level agreements, etc.) than waiting time.
We study the effect of such deadlines on strategic behaviour in priority queues.
We model a queueing game where customers have a choice to pay a toll for priority access, allowing them to skip part of the queue.
In this model, the meeting of the deadline is the most important factor in the utility functions of the customers.
When looking at symmetric Nash equilibria in this model, we find Evolutionary Stable Strategy equilibria which do not exist in the model without deadlines.
In addition, we model a heterogeneous situation where different groups of costumers have different deadlines and study how this influences social welfare and revenue.
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Queuing Systems
Status: accepted
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