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1035. Water banks as bargaining games
Invited abstract in session MC-36: Game Theory, Solutions and Structures III, stream Game Theory, Solutions and Structures.
Monday, 12:30-14:00Room: 32 (building: 306)
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | María Borrego-Marín
|
| Applied Economics III, University of Seville | |
| 2. | Amparo Mármol
|
| Economia Aplicada III and IMUS, Universidad de Sevilla | |
| 3. | Victoriana Rubiales Caballero
|
| Economía Aplicada III, Universidad de Sevilla | |
| 4. | Miguel A. Hinojosa
|
| Universidad Pablo de Olavide |
Abstract
Water banks constitute a market mechanism that enables the voluntary reallocation of flows to respond to both temporary and structural changes in the availability of this resource. Good management of water banks makes it possible to reduce social conflicts associated with water scarcity through temporary or permanent reallocation of the resource based on the supply and demand of users. Negotiation games are a methodology to formalise and analyse the consequences of the interaction between potential water sellers and buyers. The possibility of cooperation between the agents involved is analysed to obtain consensual solutions that improve the result that they can individually ensure. In particular, Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solutions are proposed to identify feasible reallocations of water that satisfy certain principles of rationality. In the absence of negative externalities, the water transfers that are determined with these solutions allow improving the economic efficiency associated with the use of water.
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Decision Theory
- Water Management
Status: accepted
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