73. Optimization framework of a two-sided auction based logistical coordination platform
Invited abstract in session WC-2: Algorithms, stream Game theory.
Wednesday, 10:00 - 11:30Room: C 103
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Márton Benedek
|
| Corvinus University of Budapest | |
| 2. | Kolos Ágoston
|
| Operations Research and Actuarial Sciences, Corvinus University of Budapest |
Abstract
We introduce an optimization-based coordination platform to increase the efficiency of regional package delivery. The proposed mechanism is based on a two-sided auction framework, with package-type bids on the one side and vehicle/delivery-capacity type offers on the other side.
After collecting all the bids for the target day, the algorithm determines the set of accepted package bids, the set of active vehicles, allocates the accepted packages to the active vehicles, and determines the route of the selected vehicles. The clearing algorithm is formulated as an optimization problem, maximizing the total value of accepted package bids, while taking into consideration various constraints related to package allocation, vehicle capacities, vehicle net income and routing considerations. The possible generalizations of the proposed model are discussed with regard to the relaxation of the vehicle-profitability constraints in the case of bidding entities with multiple vehicles, the possible alternative approaches for distributing the potential surplus and the possible consideration of vehicles with already required pickup and delivery points.
Keywords
- Analysis and engineering of optimization algorithms
Status: accepted
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