VOCAL 2024
Abstract Submission

60. Continuous generalized games

Invited abstract in session TB-2: Strategic games, stream Game theory.

Thursday, 10:00 - 11:30
Room: C 103

Authors (first author is the speaker)

1. Imre Balog
CUB
2. Miklós Pintér
Corvinus Center for Operational Research, Corvinus University of Budapest

Abstract

In our presentation, we examine the existence of equilibrium for finite stochastic games. For this purpose, we introduce a new concept – continuous generalized game – in order to provide a fixed point theorem based proof of the existence for equilibrium of a special class of finite stochastic games (generalized discounted). In our proof, we show that all mentioned stochastic games are so-called continuous generalized game. Regarding continuous generalized games, we show that they have an equilibrium.

Keywords

Status: accepted


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