774. Influencer's Persuasion for Self-Owned Brand When Endorsing National Brand
Invited abstract in session WA-47: Consumer Demand and Marketing II, stream Retail Operations.
Wednesday, 8:30-10:00Room: Parkinson B08
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Jingxin Zhang
|
Abstract
Top influencers can persuade their self-owned brand (IB) to consumers as well as endorsing national brand (NB). This paper investigates the influencer's optimal persuasion mechanism in co-opetitive relationship with supplier. Utilizing a Bayesian Persuasion framework, the influencer makes evaluation effort to improve the precision of information. After trading off the margin-increasing effect and evaluation effort cost, the influencer has more incentives to improve information precision as the evaluation efficiency increases. The optimal information strategy evolves from no disclosure to partial disclosure, and ultimately to full disclosure. Correspondingly, consumers behaviors shift from not searching and directly purchasing NB, to searching for information and follow the influencer's persuasion. Two key system parameters, evaluation efficiency and IB prior perception, have non-monotonic impacts on both supplier and influencer. Specifically, an increasing evaluation efficiency may harm the supplier when it is relatively low but benefit the supplier when it is high. Additionally, a higher IB prior perception may benefit the supplier but harm the influencer. We also investigate the impact of different pricing timings in extension. The influencer under late pricing exerts weakly higher effort in evaluation than under early pricing. Correspondingly, the influencer prefers late pricing, while the supplier’s preference varies based on system parameters.
Keywords
- E-Commerce
- Game Theory
- Marketing
Status: accepted
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