579. Optimal Strategic Equilibrium in Transport Corridors with Geopolitical Tensions: A Game Theoretic Approach
Invited abstract in session WB-23: Optimization Models in Supply Chain and Financial Modeling, stream OR for Societal Development.
Wednesday, 10:30-12:00Room: Esther Simpson 3.01
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Bruno Kamdem
|
| Department of Business Management, SUNY Farmingdale State College, School of Business |
Abstract
Global supply chain disruptions, particularly in the energy sector, due to geopolitical conflicts have compelled stakeholders to diversify resources by investing in alternative transport corridors. This strategy enhances reliability, builds long-term resilience, and reduces dependency on singular routes. Our study introduces a stochastic differential game-theoretic framework to navigate the complexities of managing transport corridors in conflict-prone areas. By employing Stochastic Differential Game Theory and Optimal Control, we model strategic interactions among key players such as governments, transport companies, and international organizations. This methodology fosters robust strategies to mitigate adversarial actions and geopolitical shifts, incorporating transportation costs and geopolitical risks into a comprehensive resilience strategy. We identify a unique Nash Equilibrium that optimizes taxation and transport mode factors, minimizing disruptions and fostering economic stability in volatile regions. The findings underscore the efficacy of cooperative strategies and the flexibility of dynamic commodity pricing mechanisms responsive to shifts in geopolitical risks. Additionally,
we propose dynamic tax policy adjustments, which are calibrated based
on commodity prices, transportation efficiency, and geopolitical exposure. Our research advances both theory and practice in transport logistics and geopolitical risk management substantially.
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Supply Chain Management
- Transportation
Status: accepted
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