562. For-profit or for-CSR: decisions of power batteries recovery in the supply chain
Invited abstract in session WB-42: Sustainable battery supply chains, stream Circular & Sustainable Supply Chains.
Wednesday, 10:30-12:00Room: Newlyn GR.02
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Ruxiao Xing
|
| College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University | |
| 2. | Bo Li
|
| College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University |
Abstract
In recent years, the massive consumption of resources has caused severe damage to the global environment, and governments are actively seeking an energy transition to cope with resource depletion and environmental pressures. The transition from traditional fuel vehicles to new energy vehicles (NEVs) will help address this dilemma. However, as the sales of new energy vehicles grow, the recycling of new energy vehicle batteries will be challenging. In this work, we aim to find measures to effectively promote the recovery of used batteries and contribute to environmental protection. This paper discusses the decisions of battery recovery in the supply chain using the Stackelberg game. Specifically, we examine the decision of a system consisting of a supplier and a manufacturer under two decision-making modes: for-profit and for-CSR. We find that if environmental damage is severe, pursuing CSR leads to high retail prices, which is detrimental to NEV sales. Second, although not each member’s collection amount improves when they consider CSR, the overall collection effect will be better. Third, we find that both the supplier and the manufacturer have incentives to pursue CSR.
Keywords
- Supply Chain Management
- Game Theory
- OR in Environment and Climate change
Status: accepted
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