2727. Deceptive Reviews in E-Commerce Markets: The Blockchain Solution and its Implications
Invited abstract in session TD-53: New Trends in Game Theory VII, stream Game Theory and Mathematical Economics.
Tuesday, 14:30-16:00Room: Liberty Moot Court
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Boru Li
|
| 2. | Yong-Hong Kuo
|
| Department of of Data and Systems Engineering, The University of Hong Kong | |
| 3. | Jie Wang
|
| Southeast University |
Abstract
Manipulation of ratings and counterfeit reviews is increasingly distorting consumer perceptions and driving up verification and marketing costs for sellers on e-commerce platforms. This study investigates blockchain technology as a potential remedy. We offer a detailed analysis of how blockchain can deter fake reviews by examining the decision-making behaviors of both consumers and online sellers. Empirically, we demonstrate that variations in review authenticity significantly shape consumer purchase intentions by influencing perceptions of product and seller credibility. Building on these findings, we model sellers’ strategic behavior. Rather than only considering a conventional e-commerce environment, we propose an alternative scenario that adopts blockchain into platforms to evaluate three strategic options: manipulating ratings, refraining from manipulation, and adopting blockchain technology. The study reveals that inflating product ratings is not always advantageous for sellers, particularly for products within a specific quality range, where abstaining from fake ratings proves more optimal. However, the incentive to adopt blockchain varies, with sellers of medium- to high-quality products being more inclined toward its implementation. Our analysis and empirical validation confirm the robustness of these findings, offering meaningful insights into how blockchain can enhance the credibility and trustworthiness of e-commerce platforms.
Keywords
- Marketing
- Decision Analysis
- Game Theory
Status: accepted
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