2039. Can rich information decrease anchorage waiting time? A game-theoretic analysis toward sustainable shipping
Invited abstract in session MD-32: Low- and zero-emission solutions for maritime operations-1, stream Maritime and Port Logistics.
Monday, 14:30-16:00Room: Maurice Keyworth 1.09
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Ayato Kitadai
|
| School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo | |
| 2. | Takuya Nakashima
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| Graduate School of Frontier Sciences, The University of Tokyo | |
| 3. | Yudai Tsurusaki
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| Graduate School of Engineering, The University of Tokyo | |
| 4. | Rei Miratsu
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| Research Institute, Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (ClassNK) | |
| 5. | Naoki Mizutani
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| NAPA Studios, NAPA Group | |
| 6. | Nariaki Nishino
|
| Department of Technology Management for Innovation, The University of Tokyo |
Abstract
This study demonstrates that reducing information incompleteness among ships can deconcentrate port arrival times, lowering greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions without compromising profits. "Sail Fast, Then Wait" (SFTW), a common practice in cargo shipping, exacerbates GHG emissions. While initiatives like the Blue Visby Consortium are making collaborative efforts to address this issue and have shown promising results in the real world, challenges remain. Ships navigate based on profitability within a competitive environment, suggesting the need to complement voluntary initiatives toward broader impact. Although game theory provides a useful framework for balancing profit and cooperation, game-theoretic studies on queuing assume homogeneous players with complete information, which does not align with actual ship navigation. To address these limitations, we formulated ship sailing as a Bayesian game under various information structures. Our results show that in environments with incomplete information, SFTW emerges as the unique equilibrium. Moreover, if any player gains access to the private information of all others, their best-response set expands, allowing for slower and more environmentally friendly actions without adversely affecting others. We further validated our theoretical results with empirical data. Our findings suggest that the prevalence of technologies enabling ships to infer others’ private information can effectively reduce SFTW and help mitigate climate change.
Keywords
- Maritime applications
- Game Theory
- Queuing Systems
Status: accepted
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