1581. Channel Expansion Decisions in a Dual E-Marketplace
Invited abstract in session MD-29: Product, Pricing, and Channel Strategies under Market Uncertainty, stream Pricing and Revenue Management Innovations.
Monday, 14:30-16:00Room: Maurice Keyworth 1.04
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | Fatemeh Zand
|
| Decision Science, HEC Montréal business school |
Abstract
This paper examines the strategic interactions between supplier encroachment and secondary marketplaces in e-commerce platforms. We study a supply chain where a supplier can sell directly through the platform’s agency channel while maintaining wholesale relationships, and the platform operates both new and secondary product marketplaces through trade-in programs.
Using a game-theoretic model, we find that supplier encroachment leads to significant secondary market expansion and transforms the platform’s reselling strategy. The supplier’s encroachment decision is primarily driven by agency channel efficiency, with counter-intuitive patterns emerging at high efficiency levels. Our results reveal that higher reselling and production costs often encourage encroachment, while a larger proportion of replacement customers reduces it
Keywords
- Game Theory
- Supply Chain Management
- Revenue Management and Pricing
Status: accepted
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