1049. Coordination and Pricing Strategy in Mobility as a Service (MaaS) system
Invited abstract in session WC-59: Urban Mobility I, stream Transportation.
Wednesday, 12:30-14:00Room: Liberty 1.14
Authors (first author is the speaker)
| 1. | min ye
|
| School of Management, University of Bath | |
| 2. | Jie Zhang
|
| 3. | Maria Battarra
|
| University of Bath | |
| 4. | Gilbert Laporte
|
| HEC Montreal | |
| 5. | Meng Meng
|
Abstract
Mobility as a Service (MaaS) is an innovative concept, that integrates various transportation services into a unified platform, enhancing accessibility, reducing congestion and improving efficiency. In the evolving market, MaaS operators and traditional service operators coexist, serving all customers while fostering collaboration between transportation operators. This study explores coordination and pricing strategies between operators in a competitive market with stochastic demand. We model the problem as a Stackelberg game where the traditional operator acts as a leader, setting capacity and pricing, while the MaaS operator, as a risk-averse follower, optimizes resource purchases. We analyse decentralised, centralised, and coordinated decision models, introducing a joint contract mechanism that aligns incentives between operators. The coordination framework incorporates wholesale pricing, revenue sharing, and risk-return contracts to mitigate demand uncertainty. Numerical experiments highlight the impact of market share, demand sensitivity, and risk aversion on optimal pricing and capacity decisions. Results show that a joint contract can enhance system efficiency and promote sustainable collaboration. These findings provide managerial insights for promoting operational efficiency and cooperation in MaaS ecosystems.
Keywords
- Transportation
- Game Theory
- OR in Sustainability
Status: accepted
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